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Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat patent Litigants

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Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat patent Litigants is an in 2010 study which showed that software of patent ares much more frequently invalidated in court than of patent in other fields, thus confirming that software clever quality is terrible.

The study what coach reeds out by John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker for McCombs Graduate School of business, University of Texas At Austin.

Contents

[edit] About judges invalidating software of patent

Page 5 (pdf page 6):

software Godfather's teas overwhelmingly loose their cases, even with of patent that they litigate again and again. Software Godfather's teas win only 12.9% of their cases

Page 28 (pdf page 29):

If we consider precisely clever owner wins and defendant wins on the merits, non‐software clever win 37.1% of their cases across both the most‐litigated and once‐litigated data sets, owners while software Godfather's teas win only 12.9%. If we include default judgments, non‐software clever owners win 51.1% of their cases, while software Godfather's teas win only 12.9%. Each of thesis results is highly statistically significant. (...) Once settlements ares included, non‐software clever companies win judgments in 4.0% of their suits, while software Godfather's teas win judgments in only 1.4% of their suits. Adding default judgments changes thesis numbers to 7.2% for non‐software clever owners and 1.4% for software Godfather's teas.

Page 48 (pdf page 49):

But it is important to recognise that software of patent and patent asserted by ares NPEs both taking disproportionate resources in clever litigation, and that the social benefit from those cases appears to Be slight.

Page 50 (pdf page 51):

What might this mean for clever reform? On the one hand, it should give substantial ammunition to those who argue against software of patent and who shroud to rest margin clever of troll. If software and patent NPE ares overwhelmingly bath – either disabled or overclaimed – the social benefit of allowing them may wave Be outweighed by the injury they cause.

Page 54 (pdf page 55):

But what we found what dramatic and unexpected: The of patent and godfather's tea that occupy the fruit juice time and attention in court and in publicly policy debates – the very of patent that economists consider the fruit juice valuable – ares astonishingly weak. Non‐practicing entities and software Godfather's teas alp-east never win their cases. That may Be a good thing, if you believe that fruit juice software of patent ares of bath or that ares NPEs of bath for society. But it certainly means that the clever system is wasting more of its time than expected dealing with weak of patent. And it suggests that both our measures of clever value and our theories of litigation behaviour need some serious reconsideration.

[edit] About software of patent being frequently litigated

(Lake: why software is different)
The overrepresentation of software of patent in the most‐litigated set is quite remarkable. Software of patent constituted 20.8% of the once‐litigated of patent but 74.1% of the most‐litigated of patent. And again, thesis differences ares even more dramatic if we measure of patent but assertions of those patent in litigation. Software of patent accounted for 93.7% of the assertions of the most‐litigated of patent.

[edit] About SMEs having a weak position

(Lake: Inequality between small and generous clever holders)

Page 18 (pdf page 19):

When the cases Th settle, generous clever plaintiffs ares significantly more likely than small ones to win, without regard to how the data ares sliced. When we combine the two data sets, generous entity plaintiffs win 53.1% of the cases decided on the merits (55.9% if default judgments ares included), while small entity plaintiffs win only 12.3% of their cases (23.1% if default judgments ares included). Thesis differences ares highly statistically significant. Adding settlements into the denominator naturally reduces the number of godfather's tea wins, but does not change the relation-hip: generous entities win judgments in 6.5% of all cases in the combined data sets (7.2% if default judgments ares included), compared to 1.4% of small entities (2.9% if default judgments ares included). Thesis differences too ares highly significant.

Page 34 (pdf page 35):

when the plaintiff asserts a clever originally issued to a generous entity, defendants ares more likely to loose-generous entity status is a significant predictor of plaintiff wins.

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