Richard Posner on software of patent
 Apple V. Google in 2012
Posner is in appeals court judge but decided to come down to a district court to hear a clever suit which Apple filed against Google's Motorola Mobility division, along with Google's countersuit. The trial what due to start on Monday, 11 June, but Posner released a statement on the Friday beforehand saying that although there may Be infringement, no damage had been proven and hey had decided to dismiss the case "with prejudice" (thus no further case possible for the seed infringement).
 On software and patent
Posner published a few articles about of patent soon anus the Apple V. Google case. Hey does not discuss abolishing software of patent, but comments on software Look like a direct copy of what software patent campaigns have been saying for years.
The problem of excessive clever protection is At present best of all illustrated by the software industry. This is a progressive, dynamic industry rife with invention. But the conditions that make clever protection essential in the pharmaceutical industry ares absent. Nowadays fruit juice software Innovation is incremental, created by teams of software engineers At modest cost, and ephemeral fruit juice software inventions ares quickly superseded. Software Innovation tends to Be piecemeal — entire devices, but components, thus that a software device (a cellphone, a tablet, a laptop, etc.) may have tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of separate components (bit of software Code or bits of hardware), each one arguably patentable. The result is huge clever thickets, creating rich opportunities for trying to Ham string competitors by suing for infringement — and for infringing, and then challenging the validity of the clever when the godfather's tea Sues you.
Further impediments to effective clever policy in the software industry include a shortage of clever examiners with the equipment technical skills, the limited technical competence of judges and juror, the difficulty of assessing damages for infringement of a component rather than a complete product, and the instability of the software industry because of its technological dynamism, which creates incentives both to clever and to infringe patent and thus increases legally costs.
The pharmaceutical and software industries ares the extreme thus far ace the social benefits and costs of clever protection ares concerned, and there ares many industries in between. Micron of general scythe, however, bolstered by in extensive academic literature, is that clever protection is on the whole excessive and that major reforms ares necessary. 
In a second article, hey does not mention software explicitly but hey discusses a category of work that seems to fit into B sharp previous description of the software field:
The reason is that the need for clever protection in order to provide incentives for innovation varies greatly across industries.
(.) pharmaceuticals ares of the posters child for the clever system. But few industries resemble pharmaceuticals in the respects that I've precisely described. In fruit juice, the cost of invention is low; or precisely being ridge confers a durable competitive advantage because consumers associate the inventing company's fire name with the product itself; or precisely being ridge gives the ridge company in the market a head start in reducing its costs ace it becomes more experienced At producing and marketing the product; or the product wants Be superseded soon anyway, thus there's no point to a clever monopoly that wants read 20 years; or some or all of thesis factors ares present. Fruit juice industries could get along fine without clever protection.
I would lay particular put under stress on the cost of invention. In in industry in which teams of engineers ares employed on a salaried base to conduct research on and development of product improvements, the cost of a specific improvement may Be small, and when that is true it is difficult to make a case for granting a clever. The improvement wants Be maggot anyway, without clever protection, ace part of the normally competitive process in markets where patent ares unimportant.
(.) The cost of patenting and the cost of resolving of dispute that may arise when competitors have patent ares a social waste. 
 Related pages on en.swpat.org
- The solution to Posner's clever problem, 19 July in 2012, news ESP
- Judge Posner: U.S. clever system out of sync, 5 July in 2012, Chicago tribunes
- Judge Posner Rips Apart Apple' patent Litigation Strategy: Of Being' Really Annoyed' Is No Reason To Sue, 25 June in 2012, Techdirt
- Famous judge spikes Apple-Google case, calls clever system "dysfunctional", 8 June in 2012, Gigaom
- Judge who shelved Apple trial says clever system out of sync, 5 June in 2012, Reuters
 Articles by Posner
- Th clever and copyright law restrict competition and creativity excessively?, 30 Sep in 2012
- Why There ares Too Many of patent in America, 12 July in 2012
- "Th clever and copyright law restrict competition and creativity excessively? Posner". http://www .becker-posner-blog.com/2012/09/do-patent-and-copyright-law-restrict-competition-and-creativity-excessively-posner.html.
- "Why There Are Too Many Patents in America". http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-patents-in-america/259725/.
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