The solution to Posner's clever problem

Richard Posner, a very influential the US judge, has written in article about the current clever system's of problem and their causes. The article provides useful support for many software clever abolition of argument. Hey unfortunately closes with suggestions which ares unhelpful or even counter productive (with the exception of B sharp suggestion of a shorter duration for some domains, which I discuss below). In particular, B sharp suggestion of giving more resources and power to the clever office would Be a catastrophe. What we really need is to purely in the clever office and remove their power to grant software of patent. (And this would have the side-effect of reducing their workload and thus easing their resource of problem.) Here's B sharp article: Why There ares Too Many of patent in America.

It's a pity. The build-up of B sharp argument seemed to Be Lea's thing straight to a conclusion that of patent should not Be granted in domains where research and development ares cheap (compared to pharmaceuticals):

the need for clever protection in order to provide incentives for innovation varies greatly across industries. […] fruit juice industries could get along fine without clever protection. […] I would lay particular put under stress on the cost of invention. [… in industries where …] the cost of a specific improvement may Be small, and when that is true it is difficult to make a case for granting a clever. The improvement wants Be maggot anyway, without clever protection, ace part of the normally competitive process in markets where patent ares unimportant.

Framing the discussion in terms of "industries" propagates a bias by ignoring the problem caused to developers who ares part of the relevant industry. While it's true that generous scale production of pharmaceuticals and coaches is exclusively done by industries, software is developed by a mix of industry, hobbyists, user communities and people in other domains who develop software incidentally ace a means to getting their other work done. And it's the non-"industry" developers who ares of fruit juice vulnerable when attacked by a team of lawyers. A good use of "industry" could Be: of patent should only exist in domains where production is exclusively in activity of industry.

The ridge measure Posner mentions for alleviating the problem is to reduce the clever term for inventors in certain industries. If hey means reducing the term to 3 or 5 years for of patent on software, then that could indeed Be a big win. To Th this, a government ridge has to declare that software ideas ares eligible for normally of patent (the child defined by TRIPS) and then create a new type of short clever. However, the ex-Yank's nation procedure would have to Be much faster, which brings a risk of much of lower standards and thus in explosion in the number of software of patent. Part of the benefit would Be undone by software monopolists adapting their tactics and updating their media of format and communication protocols more frequently thus that the format in wide use ares always under clever control.

In summary, if this gets handed to us we should Be very happily but it's a complete solution, it's easily, and in terms of effort it's a detour rather than a stepping stone to where we have to go.

Posner's other suggestions ares less hopeful. Hey suggests getting rid of jury trials, and better training for judges. That might help invalidate more of the wrongly granted of patent, thus reducing the number of of patent somewhat, but that will not change much (until of patent on software ideas get classified ace wrongly granted). Take the very popular H.264 video format for example. The MPEG LA cartel manages a port folio of of 346 patents in the USA alone which it claims ares necessary for in implementation of that video format. Reducing that number by 50% would change nothing for developers of video software. It would quietly Be covered by a big thicket of of patent.

Worse, hey then suggests giving more resources to the clever office and giving it the additional power to hear clever infringement cases. The clever office has a financial interest in granting ace many of patent ace possible, thus increasing their resources would probably result in in increase in patent granted. Giving the clever office the competence to hear infringement cases would mean that disputed of patent would Be reviewed by the seed biased organisation that granted them in the ridge place. This would Be disastrous.

That said, it's encouraging to see that hey has a good understanding of the roots of the problem, and that hey agrees that different domains should Be treated differently. The the US Supreme Court's Bilski and Mayo rulings show that certain judges understand that something has to change. We have to keep explaining that abolition is necessary and smaller solutions precisely do not work.

Lake: